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Financing health in high-income countries
The main lesson from the experience of high-income countries with health care
ﬁnancing is a simple one: ﬁnancing reforms should support the ultimate goal of uni-
versal coverage. Most high-income countries started with voluntary health insurance
systems, which were then gradually extended to compulsory social insurance for cer-
tain groups and ﬁnally reached universal coverage, either as nationwide social health
insurance schemes or as tax-ﬁnanced national health services. The risk pooling and
prepayment functions are essential. Moreover, the revenue collection mechanisms,
whether as general tax revenues or payroll taxes, are secondary to the basic object of
providing ﬁnancial protection through effective risk pooling mechanisms.The experi-
ence of high-income countries indicates that private health insurance, medical sav-
ings accounts, and other forms of private resource collection are supplementary
methods for increasing universal coverage.
Low- and middle-income countries can draw six lessons from the experience
of high-income countries:
• Facilitate steady economic growth. Most important for speeding up the transi-
tion to universal coverage is raising the level of GDP per capita. An increasing
GDP per capita enables individuals and employers to make contributions or
pay taxes to support the health system.As health preferences change as income
rises,boosting demand for beneﬁts,steady economic growth and its multiplier
effects are needed to facilitate universal coverage.
• Initiate pilot projects for voluntary health insurance. The development of ﬁnanc-
ing schemes seems to roughly follow a standardized path,beginning with volun-
tary health insurance, often in the form of community-ﬁnanced schemes. Such
pilot projects play a vital role in building public conﬁdence in prepaid schemes.
For example, voluntary health insurance clearly helped Germany and Japan
develop skills in administering funds and provided skilled staff for the later
introduction of compulsory schemes (Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 2002).
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programs is essential for the survival of health ﬁnancing schemes. In the
Republic of Korea,the availability of well-trained middle-management admin-
istrators was instrumental in expanding the social health insurance system
(Carrin and James 2004).
• Ensure political commitment to expand population coverage. Voluntary health
insurance was usually followed by the introduction of compulsory social health
insurance for certain groups. The experience of Germany and Japan shows that
economic prosperity is not a precondition for this essential step, as both coun-
tries were still “poor”when compulsory social health insurance was introduced.
The further development of ﬁnancing schemes toward full coverage, however,
does require economic development. It is striking that—after the introduction
of social health insurance—most of the studied countries gradually integrated
more and more groups, extending coverage from the employees of larger com-
panies to those of medium-size and small companies as economic prosperity
increased and the middle class started to grow (OECD 2003). The gradual
expansion of coverage was essential in training administrators and staff.
Whereas a formal sector—an achievement of economic growth—is relevant for
the systematic expansion of social health insurance, a clear political commit-
ment to expand population coverage is crucial,as Germany demonstrated.
• Combine expansion of population coverage with risk pooling. As coverage is
expanded, reliance on small, fragmented risk pools (such as community
schemes in each village) will be insufﬁcient.Such small insurers are at high risk
of insolvency, because their income and expenditures are unstable. Further-
more, the insured in those small pools are at high risk of paying inequitable
premiums,because their health risks are unevenly distributed.These problems
can be countered by increasing the size of each insurer (to more than a few
thousand), by introducing reinsurance, and ultimately by introducing a more
encompassing risk pooling mechanism, optimally including the total popula-
tion. Such mechanisms can be initially relatively simple and administratively
easy to handle.
• Ensure evaluation of products and services at each stage. No matter how small
the initial budget for health care, it should include a system to evaluate the
effects of the products and services ﬁnanced. Only technologies that have
proved their effectiveness under the circumstances of the particular countries
should be included in the beneﬁt package.
Main reform trends in high-income countries
This chapter deﬁnes high-income countries as having a per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) of more than $16,000 in purchasing power parities.
That encompasses all established market economies within the Organisation
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Turkey, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and including Singa-
pore.These 25 countries include 18 within Europe (the EU-15 countries plus Ice-
land, Norway, and Switzerland), 2 in North America (Canada and the United
States),and 5 in East Asia and the Paciﬁc (Australia,Japan,the Republic of Korea,
New Zealand, and Singapore). Countries are divided into three groups on the
basis of their main mechanism of health care ﬁnancing (table 9.1).Where appro-
priate, the degree of private ﬁnancing as a percentage of total health expenditure
is also used for groupings.
Since the late 1970s, much political and scientiﬁc attention in high-income
countries has focused on the “ﬁnancial”aspects of their health care systems. This
attention has been driven by concern for containing costs and, to a lesser degree,
increasing efﬁciency. At the same time, health care systems were substantially—
albeit often publicly less visibly—reformed in pursuit of nonﬁnancial objectives,
such as greater coverage and comprehensiveness, to increase access and equity.
Most notably, Australia (in 1975), Portugal (1978), Ireland (1980), Greece
(1984), Spain (late 1980s), and Korea (1989) introduced mandatory universal
Financing health in high-income countries 281
TABLE 9.1 High-income country groups by health ﬁnancing mechanism, 2002
Mainly tax- Systems ﬁnanced mainly
ﬁnanced systems through social security contributions Mixed, mainly private ﬁnancing
















a. Strictly speaking, private expenditure constitutes a majority of the total, but due to the dominance of the social security
















HFR_ch09.qxd  3/15/06  3:50 PM  Page 281coverage. Belgium (1998) and France (2000) followed by extending their social
health insurance systems to parts of the population that were still uninsured
because of the prevailing principle of present or past professional status as the
basis for sickness fund enrollment.
The most important expansions of coverage occurred in long-term care, as in
Austria (1993), Germany (1996), Luxembourg (1998), and Japan (2000). Devel-
opments differed for dental care and pharmaceuticals; some countries restricted
coverage in these areas, whereas others included them.
The organization of pooling and purchasing arrangements has seen changes in
many high-income countries. Pooling has generally—at least in social health
insurance countries—become more centralized, while purchasing—at least in
most tax-ﬁnanced systems—has generally become more decentralized. Social
health insurance systems pursued this road to achieve more equity among their
often small and fragmented sickness funds,often further burdened by very differ-
ing risk structures. In some countries, such centralization was combined with
both more state intervention (into the pooling mechanism and the allocation for-
mula) and free choice among sickness funds for those insured. In tax-ﬁnanced
countries, decentralization of the purchasing function is thought to increase
accountability to the public, as well as the efﬁciency of care provision (and, in
some countries,choice of provider).Whether this decentralization of purchasing—
and concurrently provision of services—will be followed by similar trends on the
collection and pooling side is subject to debate—most notably in Italy.
In addition to spending controls through budgets or caps, cost containment
efforts have included increased reliance on out-of-pocket payments by patients at
the point of service,albeit not in all countries.Such payments can be regressive and
are not considered to be clinically appropriate tools for moderating demand, but
they can increase allocative efﬁciency if carefully designed. For example, a copay-
ment scheme with income limits, recently introduced in Germany, led to signiﬁ-
cantly less physician contacts without discouraging either low-income groups or
persons with bad health.As the importance of copayment mechanisms grows, pol-
icy makers are increasingly aware of their problems of regressivity. In the Nether-
lands,for example,dental care for adults was excluded,then partly reintroduced out
of fear of uncovered parts of the population—but then again excluded.In Japan,the
last big increase in coinsurance rates from 20 to 30 percent in the employees’health
insurance in April 2003 was politically sold as increasing equity,because the national
health insurance rate was already at that level. At the same time, policy makers
added a clause to the law that cost sharing would never exceed that level.
Coverage decisions and beneﬁt entitlements
Coverage entails the extent of the covered population, the range of covered ser-
vices, and the extent to which costs of the deﬁned services are covered by prepaid
ﬁnances rather than cost-sharing requirements. The aspiration of fulﬁlling these
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the founding principles of the British National Health Service in 1948:“universal,
comprehensive, and free at the point of delivery.”
Who is covered?
Improving access to health care services has been a fundamental objective of health
policy making in OECD countries in the past 30 years. With the exception of the
United States, all countries reviewed here had achieved universal or nearly univer-
sal coverage of their populations in the 1990s (Docteur and Oxley 2003).The crite-
ria for entitlement to coverage differ markedly among social health insurance
countries,tax-ﬁnanced countries,and countries where a large part of health care is
ﬁnanced through private health insurance or medical savings accounts.
Social health insurance system countries. Because historically social health insur-
ance systems are work-related insurance programs, universal coverage was not
their original intention. Although coverage has been gradually expanded to non-
working parts of the population in all social health insurance countries, universal
coverage is a recent phenomenon. Switzerland achieved universal coverage in
1996, Belgium in 1998, and France as late as 2000.A notable exception in Europe
was the Netherlands,which introduced its long-term care insurance (AWBZ) on a
full-population basis as early as 1968. Even earlier, the Japanese social health
insurance system achieved universal coverage with an amendment of the 1938
National Insurance Act in 1961. Since then, membership in one of the 5,124 sick-
ness funds (as of 2002) is compulsory for the entire population.
The government of the Republic of Korea introduced social health insurance in
1976 to relieve the excessive burden of household medical care expenses and to
promote the health of its population. Initially, all companies with more than 500
employees were required to offer health insurance to their employees. Over the
years, this obligation was gradually extended to companies of ever smaller size,
reaching those with only ﬁve employees in 1988. At the beginning of the 1980s,
insurance coverage was also gradually expanded to government and private
school employees and the self-employed, including employees in companies with
fewer than ﬁve employees.Universal coverage was thus achieved in 1989,when the
urban self-employed were incorporated into the scheme (OECD 2003).At the end
of the 1990s a convergence process started,leading in 2000 to the formation of the
National Health Insurance Corporation which absorbed all 139 employee health
insurance societies (OECD 2004a).
Tax-ﬁnanced system countries. In contrast to most social health insurance coun-
tries,where the goal of universal coverage has been stated fairly recently,universal
coverage has been a central feature of countries with tax-ﬁnanced models.In New
Zealand the main policy objective to provide “free care for all”dates to 1938. The
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With the establishment of the Medicare Program in 1984, Australia reestablished
a mandatory insurance scheme to obtain universal coverage (which had been
introduced as Medibank in 1975, but which was then diluted through the subse-
quent addition of an opt-out option) (Hilless and Healy 2001).
In Northern European and Australasian tax-ﬁnanced health care systems (such
as in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian coun-
tries),entitlement to health care services is based on residence,independent of cit-
izenship. The population not covered in these countries is accordingly very small
and limited basically to illegal immigrants. Universal coverage is a more recent
phenomenon in Southern European tax-ﬁnanced countries,but by 2002 all coun-
tries with a national health service in Southern Europe had also achieved nearly
universal coverage.
Italy introduced a national health service with the objective of universal cover-
age in 1978. Before 1978, 93 percent of the population was covered by public
health insurance, although under markedly varying conditions. The 1978 reform
changed the principle of health care ﬁnancing: solidarity within professional cate-
gories was discarded in favor of intergenerational solidarity, which backed the
introduction of universal, free coverage for all Italian citizens. Non-Italian resi-
dents were at ﬁrst not included under this legislation. Since 1998, however, legal
immigrants have had the same rights as Italian citizens. Measures were also taken
to provide some care to illegal immigrants,who now have access to a limited range
of health care services,in particular to treatment for infectious diseases and health
care schemes for babies and pregnant women (Donatini and others 2001).
In Spain, access to health services is through ownership of an individual elec-
tronic health card (TSI). Since 2001, the TSI has been available for citizens and
foreign residents. There is no difference between Spanish citizens and migrants,
even if they are considered “illegal.” A new initiative in Catalonia has broadened
the group of migrants owning a TSI, irrespective of their legal status, thus
enabling them to access the public health networks.By offering information about
services included in the TSI and facilitating access, Spain’s strategies for reaching
marginalized populations will make coverage almost universal (Velasco Garrido
and Busse 2005).
In Portugal,in addition to the national health service,which covers 83.5 percent
of the population, private insurance schemes cover an additional 10 percent, and
mutual funds cover 6.5 percent. Generally, the beneﬁts received under private
insurance or mutual fund schemes exceed those provided within the national
health service.However,in both subsystems employer and employee contributions
are often insufﬁcient to cover the full costs of care, and consequently a signiﬁcant
proportion of costs are shifted onto the national health service.If enrollees in these
funds do not declare their membership when receiving treatment within the
284 Health Financing Revisited
HFR_ch09.qxd  3/15/06  3:50 PM  Page 284national health service, the funds are exempted from responsibility for the full
costs of the members’ care. The relationship between the national health service
and the subsystems was explicitly addressed by legislation in late 1998. Under an
“opting-out” scheme, ﬁnancial responsibility for personal care in the national
health service could be transferred to public or private entities through a contribu-
tion established in a contract with the Ministry of Health (Bentes and others 2004).
In the U.S.health system,individuals are insured through a variety of schemes:
employer-sponsored insurance, individual (nongroup) insurance, Medicare,
Medicaid,the State Children’s Health Insurance Program,and coverage offered by
the military and the Veterans Administration. In 2002 an estimated 43.6 million
people, 15.2 percent of the U.S. population, had no health coverage during the
entire year (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). Health insurance coverage in the United
States is more dynamic than in countries with less fragmented health systems
because, for most people, it is closely linked to individual employers who negoti-
ate and take out group insurance plans for their employees.This means that many
people are uninsured, at least for part of the year (CBO 2003).
In summary, all high-income countries reviewed have achieved nearly univer-
sal coverage independently of the ﬁnancing mechanism—with the exception of
the United States. The difference in the speed of attaining universal coverage is
linked to the choice of ﬁnancing mechanism. In Northern European and Aus-
tralasian tax-ﬁnanced systems, universal coverage was a political goal from the
start in the 1930s and 1940s,whereas in European social health insurance systems,
universal coverage developed gradually over the past 100 years,and even the polit-
ical discussion about universal coverage in these countries is fairly recent. South-
ern European tax-ﬁnanced systems take an intermediate position. They have in
common rapid economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century,par-
alleled by an expansion of tax-ﬁnanced health coverage or, in Spain, by a shift
from a fragmented social health insurance system to a tax-ﬁnanced system. Like-
wise, Japan expanded coverage under its social health insurance system during a
phase of rapid economic growth in the 1960s. Korea expanded coverage the
fastest, increasing coverage from 15 percent to 100 percent within 10 years, again
during a period of economic growth. This rapid expansion was facilitated by ini-
tially relatively high copayment levels and limited beneﬁts.
The other crucial factor for attaining universal coverage is political will: clear
legislation, either at the set-up or gradually to ﬁll in coverage gaps, to achieve
universal coverage. Such political will is best exempliﬁed by recent Italian legis-
lation that addresses health care for illegal immigrants. The United States,
despite several attempts (most recently during the Clinton administration), has
no political consensus to achieve universal coverage—a high-income country
with sustained economic growth and no major changes in coverage levels over
the past 30 years.
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Social health insurance system countries. A central characteristic of social health
insurance systems is the deﬁnition of the beneﬁts to which the insured are entitled
(Gibis, Koch-Wulkan, and Bultman 2004). This characteristic was recently rein-
forced in 2001 in the Netherlands,when a court ruled that entitlements (in this case,
in AWBZ) had to be guaranteed irrespective of their costs.The contents of the ben-
eﬁts basket,as well as the processes applied to deﬁne them,range from a list of ben-
eﬁts decreed by law (as in the Netherlands) to negotiations between sickness funds
and providers (as in Germany). Among the notable differences in contents are the
inclusion of beneﬁts outside acute curative care, especially health promotion mea-
sures and long-term care. For example, Germany introduced a separate social care
insurance scheme to cover ambulatory long-term care in 1995. This scheme was
rapidly expanded to cover institutional care in 1996.
Historically,European social health insurance systems,initially set up to regain
and maintain the productivity capacity of diseased workers, focused on insuring
curative hospital and ambulatory care (Kupsch and others 2000).To this day,pre-
ventive services are offered to a lesser extent by the social health insurance sys-
tems, compared with the British or Scandinavian tax-ﬁnanced systems (McKee,
Delnoij,and Brand 2004).
There are at least two ways to enhance the supply of preventive services in
social health insurance schemes with multiple sickness funds. First, collective
health services could be kept separate from the social health insurance scheme, as
in the case of mammography in the Netherlands, where such services parallel the
main social health insurance scheme. Second, incentives could be provided for
sickness funds to invest in the future of their insured by offering certain preven-
tion programs. Some social health insurance countries regulate preventive ser-
vices by law.Germany,for example,has chosen to enhance preventive activities by
direct regulation in a social health insurance system.Apart from enhancing public
supply, increased use of preventive services can be stimulated through ﬁnancial
incentives for individuals. Bonus payments or similar instruments can be offered
by sickness funds to increase the use of preventive services (for example, in Ger-
many certain copayments can be lifted if individuals can prove they have made
use of preventive services).
In almost all European social health insurance countries, ambulatory health
care is provided by physicians operating mainly on a fee-for-service basis (Gibis,
Koch-Wulkan, and Bultman 2004). Consequently, beneﬁts catalogues had to be
introduced—primarily as fee schedules. However, fee-for-service payments have
evolved into quite elaborate remuneration schemes in some countries or have
been limited to certain groups of doctors.
Hospital care is usually organized in a decentralized way, and hospitals have a
high degree of autonomy. Beneﬁts catalogues for hospital care are rare. Some
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implementing diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment systems. These systems
could subsequently lead to beneﬁts catalogues that list all approved interventions
grouped around diagnoses. The government’s role in deﬁning such in-patient
beneﬁts catalogues is likely to be greater than its role in ambulatory care (Gibis,
Koch-Wulkan, and Bultman 2004).
Coverage of pharmaceuticals differs considerably among the European social
health insurance countries. In some countries, such as Germany or Switzerland,
licensure by the European Medicines Evaluation Agency or the national equiva-
lent allows reimbursement in the social health insurance system; other countries,
such as France and the Netherlands, have established positive lists of covered
drugs. This also applies to the amount of coverage. Dental coverage has been
reduced or restricted (despite the technical progress in this ﬁeld) in almost all
European social health insurance systems (Kaufhold and Schneider 2000).
Tax-ﬁnanced system countries. In most European tax-ﬁnanced systems, beneﬁts
catalogues are not explicitly deﬁned. For example, in the United Kingdom, the
secretary of state for health is legally required to provide services “to such extent as
he considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements”(1977 Act).The secre-
tary’s duty is to arrange for practitioners to provide an acceptable level of service
for the resident population. What constitutes an acceptable level of service
remains vague, however.
Among Southern European tax-ﬁnanced countries, Spain introduced the
ﬁrst explicit beneﬁts catalogue in 1995. A list of beneﬁts guaranteed by the
public health system was drawn up under a royal decree, which maintained the
beneﬁts already available within the system and made those services universal
(Rico, Sabes, and Wisbaum 2000). A number of services have been speciﬁcally
excluded from the beneﬁts catalogue, including psychoanalysis, sex-change
surgery, spa treatments, cosmetic surgery, and all but the most basic dental
care. In practice, however, the royal decree has never been fully implemented.
Following regionalization of the national health service in January 2002,
regional variations in covered beneﬁts became more obvious: some regions
cover dental care, whereas others have a smaller negative pharmaceutical list
(cover drugs more generously).
In contrast to most European systems and the New Zealand tax-ﬁnanced sys-
tem, the Australian health system has an explicit beneﬁts catalogue called the
Medicare Beneﬁts Schedule, which is constructed using an evidence-based
approach. The Medicare Beneﬁts Schedule sets out a schedule fee for medical ser-
vices for which the commonwealth government will pay medical beneﬁts.Covered
items include consultation fees for doctors and specialists,radiology and pathology
tests,eye tests by optometrists,and surgical and therapeutic procedures performed
by doctors. Medicare does not cover dental treatment, ambulance services, home
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podiatry services, treatment by psychologists, visual and hearing aids and prosthe-
ses, medical services that are not clinically necessary, and cosmetic surgery (Hilless
and Healy 2001).
In the United States, covered beneﬁts vary widely across private health insur-
ance plans—from the most basic to luxury care—depending on the level of pre-
mium and the employer. Medicare is the main insurance program for the
population above 65 years old (as well as for the disabled and those with end-stage
renal disease); it covers approximately 41 million people. The Medicare Coverage
Database contains a detailed list of all beneﬁts included on a national and a state-
by-state basis. This list is continuously reviewed and amended. For example, the
Medicare law (effective since January 1, 2005) expanded coverage to diabetic
screening services, and the beneﬁts catalogue had to be amended accordingly (for
example,home blood glucose testing had to be added to the catalogue).The most
important change in recent years was the inclusion of prescription drugs in the
2003 Medicare Modernization Act,which took effect in January 2006.Reimburse-
ment is through a complex payment structure that covers an initial portion of
drug costs,then includes a signiﬁcant gap in coverage,and later picks up the costs
of catastrophic drug coverage at a deﬁned level.
Summary. Most tax-ﬁnanced health systems do not have a deﬁned beneﬁts cata-
logue, whereas most social health insurance systems, which have fee-for-service
payment mechanisms to remunerate providers, do. Lack of deﬁned beneﬁts leads
to implicit addition of new services or technologies to the national health service
beneﬁts catalogue during the commissioning process,which can vary among geo-
graphic areas.The result can be what is called “postcode prescribing”in the United
Kingdom. Such prescribing is considered to be inequitable. Most social health
insurance systems need an explicit mechanism to include new technologies or to
exclude those thought to be ineffective or inefﬁcient from the explicit beneﬁts cat-
alogue. Inclusion and exclusion decisions are often difﬁcult to make because good
evidence is sparse and often costly to develop.Moreover,such decisions are subject
to the threat of lawsuits by industry. Thus, many countries have set up capacity-
building programs, such as the United Kingdom’s national health service research
and development evidence-base research program, and new agencies for health
technology assessment to guide decision makers (Velasco Garrido and Busse 2005).
Paying for health services
All countries under review require some form of cost sharing from individuals.
However, the amount of out-of-pocket payments for health services in high-
income countries varies widely.In Europe,cost sharing has not followed a consis-
tent trend from 1980 to 2001 (table 9.2).While in many countries cost sharing has
increased during this period, it has decreased in others, such as in Ireland and the
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TABLE 9.2 Share of out-of-pocket and voluntary health insurance payments in total health 
expenditures in 12 European countries, 1980–2001
Country and type 1980 (% of total 1999–2001 (% of total Percentage point






Voluntary health insurance 
Denmark
Out of pocket
Voluntary health insurance 
Finland
Out of pocket
Voluntary health insurance 
France
Out of pocket
Voluntary health insurance 
Germany
Out of pocket
Voluntary health insurance 
Greece
Out of pocket
Voluntary health insurance 
Ireland
Out of pocket






Voluntary health insurance 
Spain
Out of pocket
Voluntary health insurance 
Sweden
Out of pocket
Voluntary health insurance 
Source: Adapted from Thomson, Mossialos, and Jemiai 2003 on the basis of national statistics.
— is not available.
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Netherlands. Outside of Europe, New Zealand saw a steep rise in out-of-pocket
payments between 1980 and 1999, from 10 to 16 percent of total health expendi-
ture,corresponding to a 6.2 percent yearly increase in real terms (French,Old,and
Healy 2001).
All high-income countries reviewed here levy some form of user charges and have
signiﬁcant out-of-pocket payments. With the exception of Austria, Greece, and the
United States, however, out-of-pocket payments represent less then 22 percent of
total health expenditure and often less than 10 percent.There is no clear trend in tax-
ﬁnanced or social health insurance systems toward increases or decreases in cost
sharing,and a great variety of cost sharing and protection mechanisms are employed.
Decisions on the extent and type of cost-sharing mechanism seem more often guided
by political opportunism than by rational arguments regarding technical efﬁciency
(Thomson,Mossialos,and Jemiai 2003; Gericke,Wismar,and Busse 2004).
Collection of funds 
The total amount of resources collected is usually not available in international
databases.Health expenditure is most often used instead,although the amount of
resources collected is in many cases higher. National health service countries are
often claimed to be more successful in cost containment and therefore are thought
to collect fewer resources, but Greece, Iceland, Norway, and Portugal are among
the countries with the highest increase in health expenditure as a percentage of
GDP.High economic growth rates contributed to low or even decreasing shares of
health expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the Republic of Korea, Singapore,
and Ireland. Norway and the United States, with similar high economic growth
rates, have experienced large increases. Thus, health expenditure and the amount
of resources collected in each country obviously depend on the individual prefer-
ences of each country.
Sources of ﬁnancing
High-income countries rely mainly on individuals, ﬁrms, and corporate entities
as sources of health care ﬁnancing and to a very small extent on nongovernmen-
tal organizations or charities. It is generally difﬁcult to determine the exact
amount ﬁrms or corporate entities contribute to health ﬁnancing, especially
regarding tax payments for general revenue. However, in countries that ﬁnance
their health expenditure mainly by social health insurance,the ratio of contribu-
tions of employers to those of employees provides some information on the
employers’contribution as a source of ﬁnancing.There is a slight trend in certain
social health insurance countries toward shifting a portion from the employers’
contribution to the employees’ contribution, as in Germany and the Nether-
lands.However,a systematic change in the ﬁnancing ratio could not be identiﬁed
across countries over the past 30 years.
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Apart from the United States, all of the countries examined derive the main part
of their health care resources either through social security contributions (or sim-
ilarly termed social health insurance arrangements) or through direct and indirect
tax payments in national health services. Currently 9 of the 25 countries studied
ﬁnance their health care system mainly by social health insurance contributions,
while 13 countries use mainly tax payments (ﬁgure 9.1). Singapore
1 and the
United States ﬁt neither of these classiﬁcations, since they ﬁnance more than half
of their health expenditure through other mechanisms, such as voluntary insur-
ance premiums and out-of-pocket payments. Nor does Greece, where private
expenditure ﬁnances slightly less than 50 percent of the total, and neither of the
two main public ﬁnancing mechanisms dominates.
2
The relative importance of the various ﬁnancing mechanisms has changed
somewhat in most countries since 1975. However, in only 9 of 23 countries (data
were not available for Belgium and Greece) did the relative importance of one of the
two main public ﬁnancing mechanisms change by more than 5 percentage points.
Compulsory social health insurance contributions. Eight of the nine countries
that predominantly rely on compulsory social insurance contributions can look
back on years of experience with social health insurance.Korea represents a special
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FIGURE 9.1 Share of tax and social health insurance revenues in total health expenditures in 
high-income countries, 2002
Source: OECD 2004a or national data.
Note: A = Austria; AUS = Australia; B = Belgium; CDN = Canada; CH = Switzerland; D = Germany; DK = Denmark; E = Spain; 
F = France; FIN = Finland; GR = Greece; I = Italy; IRL = Ireland; IS = Iceland; J = Japan; L = Luxemburg; N = Norway; 
NL = Netherlands; NZ = New Zealand; P = Portugal; ROK = Republic of Korea; S = Sweden; SGP = Singapore; 
UK = United Kingdom; USA = United States of America.
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the second most important ﬁnancing mechanism in the 1970s to a system based to
a considerable degree on compulsory social health insurance contributions. As in
many other countries, such as Germany, social health insurance in Korea started
with a small scheme for industrial workers in 1977 and was gradually extended to
other population groups. In 2002, 42.2 percent of total health expenditure was
ﬁnanced by compulsory insurance contributions.
The main part of the collected health care resources in countries with social
health insurance is raised through wage-related contributions, which are shared
between employers and employees. Nonetheless, arrangements differ among
countries, and changes have taken place over the past three decades.
All insured, regardless of their sickness fund and membership status, con-
tribute at a uniform rate in Belgium,France,Korea,Luxembourg,and the Nether-
lands. In Austria, as of 2003, rates varied between 6.9 percent and 9.1 percent,
according to employment status but not between funds. In 2004, a reform equal-
ized contribution rates among different employment groups.In Japan,rates differ
according to employment status, and in the municipal health insurance scheme
rates also differ among sickness funds of each municipality. In Germany, the con-
tribution rates differ among funds but not by employment status.Germany is also
the only country (since 1996) that uses the variability of contribution rates among
sickness funds as a parameter for competition among funds.However,in Switzer-
land differing per capita premiums are used in a similar way.
3
In Belgium and the Netherlands, a nonincome-related per capita premium on
top of the contributions was introduced in the 1990s.Premiums differ among sick-
ness funds in the Netherlands,but have remained mostly uniform in Belgium.Like
the contribution rate in Germany, this mechanism allows varying contributions
among sickness funds to be used as a parameter for competition among them. In
contrast, in France and Korea, nonwage-related components were introduced to
enlarge the ﬁnancial base for sickness funds and thus increase overall revenue. In
addition, contributions became less vulnerable to wage and employment ﬂuctua-
tions (Sandier and others 2004). Since 1998, France has replaced the solely wage-
related contributions of employees with a general social contribution of 5.25
percent that,apart from wages,also includes such nonwage-related income as cap-
ital gains and interest; 3.25 percent is charged on beneﬁts and allowances.
Direct and indirect taxes. Spain and Iceland have moved away from social health
insurance and managed the transition to tax payments as the main ﬁnancing
mechanism (box 9.1).In both countries this change was motivated by the percep-
tion that the tax payment mechanism was less regressive, although social health
insurance contributions, if designed appropriately, might have achieved a level of
progressivity similar to that achieved in Spain,which transformed its system from
a regressive one in 1980 to a neutral one in 1990.
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which led to a relative (albeit minor) increase in the percentage of social security
contributions. The share of tax payments decreased from 66.1 percent of total
health expenditure in 1975 to 59.7 percent in 2002,while social security contribu-
tions increased from 12.6 percent in 1975 to 15.9 percent in 2002 (Järvelin, Rico,
and Cetani 2002).Canada and Norway experienced even more dramatic slashes in
the share of taxes in health expenditures in favor of more private ﬁnancing mech-
anisms.However,this development did not reﬂect a decrease in available taxes (as
in Finland), but rather a massive cut in health spending from general revenue,
revealing the vulnerability of tax payments to changes in political priorities.
Instead of getting resources for health from general revenue, some suggest ear-
marking taxes for health expenditure, a move not even undertaken in countries
whose health expenditures are mainly tax ﬁnanced (though in the case of Sweden it
could be argued that provincial taxes are de facto earmarked as the vast majority
are used for health care).Instead,earmarked taxes have been introduced as a source
of complementary ﬁnancing in countries with mainly social security ﬁnancing: in
France, 3.3 percent of the total health revenue is raised as earmarked taxes on car
usage,tobacco,and alcohol consumption.In addition,the pharmaceutical industry
is required to pay an earmarked tax on advertising, accounting for 0.8 percent of
total health revenue (Sandier and others 2004).
Voluntary insurance premiums. Voluntary health insurance can be classiﬁed into
various forms that, depending on the deﬁnition, partly overlap: substitute health
insurance as an alternative to statutory schemes; supplementary health insurance
to cover services not included in the beneﬁts basket of statutory schemes and to
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In Iceland,more than 60 percent of health
expenditures were ﬁnanced by ﬂat-rate insur-
ance contributions to sickness funds until
1972.Because these contributions were per-
ceived to be too regressive and because health
expenditures were rapidly rising,it was
decided to shift to tax payments.In the transi-
tion period from 1972 to 1989,sickness funds
were retained but received their funding com-
pletely from tax payments,80 percent from the
state and 20 percent from local governments
(Halldorsson and Bankauskaite 2003).
Spain also relied mainly on social health
insurance contributions.In the mid-1970s,the
social health insurance contributions made
up about two-thirds of total health care
expenditures,and tax payments covered the
rest.In 1986 the introduction of a national
health service initiated a major shift toward
tax funding.By 1989 the previous pattern was
reversed for the ﬁrst time;tax payments con-
stituted 70 percent and social health
insurance contributions dropped to about 30
percent of the total.Throughout the 1990s,
the role of social health insurance contribu-
tions has been steadily decreasing (Rico,
Sabes,and Wisbaum 2000).
BOX 9.1 The transition from social health insurance to tax
ﬁnancing in Iceland and Spain
HFR_ch09.qxd  3/15/06  3:50 PM  Page 293provide superior amenities; duplicate health insurance, which provides people
already covered by a given public health system with private alternative coverage
for the same sets of services, often furnished by different providers; and comple-
mentary health insurance covering copayments or deductibles applicable to pub-
lic health systems (OECD 2004b).
Small markets for supplementary health insurance occur in all included coun-
tries, but Canada represents a special case because 65 percent of its population is
covered by this kind of voluntary health insurance.Voluntary health insurance is
allowed to cover only services not covered under the public system. Such addi-
tional beneﬁts include mainly drugs and certain dental services, long-term care,
rehabilitative care,and home care.Switzerland is by far the largest market for sup-
plementary voluntary health insurance (OECD 2004b).
Duplicate voluntary health insurance is typically available in countries with tax-
ﬁnanced national health services, where amounts or quality of publicly provided
health services are perceived to be insufﬁcient or inappropriate. The main drivers
are the length of waiting lists and the desire to choose providers.Large parts of the
population are covered by duplicate voluntary health insurance in Australia (more
than 40 percent), Ireland (also more than 40 percent), and New Zealand (35 per-
cent) (OECD 2004b). While the share of voluntary health insurance increased in
New Zealand over the last decade, it decreased in Australia, perhaps because of
improved public services, among other factors. However, the Australian govern-
ment has repeatedly tried to reverse this decline in voluntary plans (box 9.2).
Many high-income countries have markets for complementary voluntary
health insurance; France and the United States (Medicare only) are the most rele-
vant cases. In France, voluntary health insurance is purchased to cover coinsur-
ance rates ranging from 20 percent for in-patient treatment and 30 percent for
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Since 1997 in Australia,individuals receive a
tax-subsidized rebate of 30 percent on health
insurance premiums,and out-of-pocket pay-
ments have been increased for persons using
medical services in private hospitals.In 2000,
lifetime coverage was introduced,and private
health insurers are allowed to vary premiums
for persons older than 30,according to age at
entry,to provide ﬁnancial incentives for join-
ing a voluntary health insurance plan before
the age of 30.These measures aim mainly at
bringing more people into private health
insurance to relieve the pressures on the
public system (Busse and Schlette 2003;
Colombo and Tapay 2003).Although popula-
tion coverage in voluntary health insurance
increased from 31 percent in 1996 to 45.3
percent in 2001 after those measures were
introduced,it is questionable whether the
whole strategy has been very successful.
Health expenditure rose even faster in the
second half of the 1990s than it had before
(from 8.5 percent to 9.0 percent of GDP
between 1995 and 2000).
BOX 9.2 Tax subsidization of duplicate private health
insurance in Australia
HFR_ch09.qxd  3/15/06  3:50 PM  Page 294physician fees to 65 percent for certain drugs (OECD 2004b). The main motiva-
tion is therefore to limit the ﬁnancial risk posed by high utilization of services.
This kind of insurance,which increased over the last decade,accounts for most of
the large per capita spending on private health insurance.
Medical savings accounts. The medical savings account, ﬁrst developed in Singa-
pore in the 1980s (box 9.3), has also been adopted in the United States. Unlike in
Singapore,the objectives in the United States are cost containment and expansion
of insurance coverage to include the uninsured (15 percent of the population).
Medical savings accounts serve primarily to ﬁnance a high deductible in order to
reduce premium payments. Medical savings accounts were tested during the
1996–2003 period in a pilot project for a limited sample of insured persons
(750,000 accounts) in the private health insurance market. Depending on the
insurance contract,either the employer or the employee was allowed to make tax-
exempt payments into medical savings accounts within a given year.The payment
of interest on capital stocks accumulated in accounts was a matter for the individual
insurance companies to decide (Public Law 104-191, August 21, 1996). Although
4 of 10 participants had not previously been insured (U.S. GAO 1998), total
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In 1984 Singapore introduced a system of med-
ical savings accounts,called Medisave.Every
employed citizen is obliged to pay a 6–8
percent share of income—according to age—
into an individual account managed by the
state.Funds in the accounts are invested in the
capital market by the government,and interest
is paid at the current market rate (Asher 2002).
Savings in the individual medical savings
account can be used to pay for hospital costs
and certain selected out-patient costs approved
by the state in a catalogue of services.This 
system was supplemented by a high-risk health
insurance scheme (called Medishield),which is
paid from contributions depending on age and
which can be ﬁnanced from individual medical
savings accounts.Medishield is intended to
ﬁnance both expensive hospital treatments and
out-patient treatments for chronic diseases.In
addition,a fund (called Medifund) is used to
support low-income individuals who do not
have a medical savings account or who are
unable to set aside sufﬁcient savings.Medifund
is ﬁnanced by the state from general taxes.
Implementation of the system of medical
savings accounts is not yet complete,because
the generation entering into retirement
before 1984 was not able to accumulate capi-
tal stocks and is therefore ﬁnanced by family
members or by state assistance.For this rea-
son,full implementation will not be achieved
until 2030.Apart from medical savings
accounts,the low share of health expenditure
(3.7 percent of GDP in 2002) may also be
attributable to the young population and an
incentive scheme of hospital classes.However,
several studies indicate that the medical sav-
ings accounts have at least made a consider-
able contribution to this low share (Prescott
and Nichols 1998;Schreyögg and Lim 2004).
BOX 9.3 Health ﬁnancing with medical savings accounts 
in Singapore
HFR_ch09.qxd  3/15/06  3:50 PM  Page 295participation was low: the number of accounts was estimated at 150,000, perhaps
because of restrictive legal conditions (Bunce 2001). There is still not enough
empirical research for rigorous evaluation of the experimental period.
Although the pilot project was not extended after it ended in 2003, the Bush
Administration introduced a new scheme of medical savings accounts, effective
on January 1, 2004, for Medicare beneﬁciaries. According to this scheme an
unlimited number of people who are eligible for Medicare are allowed to choose a
policy with a minimum deductible of $1,000 for singles and $2,000 for families in
combination with medical savings accounts. Employers of all sizes can offer these
programs to their employees, but they must be approved by the Medicare pro-
gram.They are funded by pretax payroll contributions or employer contributions.
The idea behind it is that Medicare beneﬁciaries are able to pay for their “qualiﬁed
expenses”(such as prescription drugs and doctors’fees),which are not covered or
not sufﬁciently covered by Medicare (Schreyögg 2004).
Various forms of out-of-pocket payments. The introduction of out-of-pocket
payments can have merely a ﬁnancial effect,shifting costs to relieve public ﬁnanc-
ing schemes from cost containment pressure, or they can have an additional
behavioral effect, preventing moral hazard (using unnecessary services because
they are free or heavily subsidized). For high-income countries, there is evidence
from a number of studies in the United States and Europe that out-of-pocket pay-
ments, especially copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles, can have the desired
effects—if carefully designed (Zweifel and Manning 2001) and if the majority of
the population does not have voluntary health insurance to cover these costs.Cru-
cial points for the success of those instruments are the amounts raised and the
equity of ﬁnancing. However, apart from out-of-pocket payments, there are also
other ways to direct health resources into the most effective utilization.
Between 1990 and 2002, the ﬁve countries with the highest increase in the
share of out-of-pocket payments are all European countries (ﬁgure 9.2).With the
exception of Luxembourg (which had very low out-of-pocket spending in 1990),
these countries have predominantly tax-ﬁnanced health systems. Three of them
(Finland,Italy,and Spain) are now among the top ﬁve (behind Korea and Switzer-
land) in out-of-pocket payments as a percentage of total health expenditure. In
contrast, countries with a relatively low share of public expenditure (Korea,
Switzerland, and the United States) largely reduced their share of out-of-pocket
payments. This might be interpreted as a trend toward convergence of countries
with high and low shares of out-of-pocket payments as a percentage of total
health expenditure.
Organizations collecting resources
Among the social health insurance countries, there is great variety in the types of
organizations collecting resources for health care.Sickness funds collect resources
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HFR_ch09.qxd  3/15/06  3:50 PM  Page 296directly in Austria, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Switzerland, for example. Other
types include associations of funds (Luxembourg),special agencies under govern-
ment control (Belgium),and the tax authorities directly (the Netherlands) (Busse,
Saltman, and Dubois 2004).
There have been changes in collecting organizations in tax-ﬁnanced systems in
the past few years. In Italy and Spain, regional or local governments have received
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FIGURE 9.2 Changing share of out-of-pocket payments in total health expenditures in 
high-income countries, 1992 and 2002
Source: OECD 2004a.
HFR_ch09.qxd  3/15/06  3:50 PM  Page 297more autonomy for resource collection (though not as much as in Sweden). In
many national health service systems, national or regional governments collect
resources.For example,Spain and Italy now allow regional governments to collect
resources, in addition to the resources they receive from national resource collec-
tion on their own. In Italy, 6 of 21 regions added funds from their own taxes to
make up for (parts of) the deﬁcit in 2002 (Jommi and Fattore 2003).
Pooling of funds
In most high-income countries, collecting and pooling take place at the central
level. In tax-ﬁnanced systems, two bodies are generally at work: the ministry of
ﬁnance or the treasury as collecting organization and the ministry of health as the
pooling organization (England, Ireland, Italy, and New Zealand). The allocation
of responsibility between these two bodies is in most cases more a matter of polit-
ical agenda setting than of objectively deﬁned allocation. New Zealand is an
exception, as it has deﬁned objective allocation criteria. Earmarked taxes, com-
bined with an independent organization responsible for pooling and collecting
resources, are another possible approach to overcome the vulnerability of the
health system to political priority setting.
Allocating resources from collecting to pooling organizations
Although in tax-ﬁnanced systems collecting and pooling are mainly centralized,
there is a trend toward decentralization of both functions. Regional governments
in Italy, Spain, and Sweden have received more autonomy in both collecting and
pooling. In Sweden, collection and pooling responsibilities have been strongly
decentralized since the 1970s.County councils rely mainly on income taxes,which
they collect themselves. In addition, counties receive subsidies from the central
government on the basis of an allocation formula (Hjortsberg and others 2001).
In contrast to tax-ﬁnanced systems,social health insurance systems are increas-
ingly moving away from decentralized pooling organizations. Many countries,
such as Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, have centralized
their pooling organizations in independent organizations at the federal level,such
as the Federal Insurance Authority in Germany or the Health Care Insurance
Board in the Netherlands. Switzerland is a special case; it pools resources only in
each “premia region” (usually on the subcanton level), so that, for example, the
high per capita expenditure in Geneva is not shared with the inhabitants of
Appenzell, where per capita expenditure is low. Such centralization came in
response to the fragmentation and small size of decentralized pools. Small pools
(sickness funds) were exposed to high ﬁnancial risks because of their inability to
share risk among a large population,and thus they needed reinsurance or tax subsi-
dies. Now centralized, sickness funds are responsible for only a fraction of health
expenditure.They act as purchasing organizations (and in a few countries as collec-
tors). The number of sickness funds has decreased sharply in Belgium, Germany,
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competition among funds in their function as purchasing organizations, but also
because of the problems and higher administrative costs associated with small
pool sizes (Korea is the exception).
The transfer between collecting and pooling organizations is only difﬁcult in
social health insurance countries where sickness funds can collect different levels
of contributions (Germany and Switzerland).In those countries,pooled resources
have to be separated from resources that stay with the sickness fund (for example,
for services not taken into account in the pooling or from contribution rates
higher than assumed in the pooling calculations).
In addition to transfers from contribution-collection organizations, in some
social health insurance countries,pooling organizations receive ﬁnancial resources
from tax authorities. Tax subsidies to the pooling organizations are substantial in
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, whereas they are small but rising in
Germany.The high Belgian tax component is the result of a policy change in 1981,
when social security contributions were lowered by 6.17 percentage points and the
value-added tax was increased in an attempt to become internationally more com-
petitive (Busse,Saltman,and Dubois 2004).
Allocating resources from pooling to purchasing organizations
In most countries,the pooling function is centralized,and purchasing bodies usu-
ally act at the regional or local level.Common purchasing bodies are regional and
local governments, as well as sickness funds.
The allocation of ﬁnancial resources from pooling to purchasing organizations
can either be prospective or retrospective.Under retrospective allocation,pooling
organizations allocate according to actual expenditures incurred by purchasing
organizations, whereas under prospective allocation a budget is determined for
future health expenditure. In Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, retro-
spective allocation according to actual expenditure was the customary approach
before reforms in the mid-1990s. Apart from Luxemburg, where this approach is
still used for services requiring patient reimbursement, such as physicians’ ser-
vices, these countries have switched to prospective allocation mechanisms. In
Korea resources are allocated retrospectively on the basis of a ﬁxed schedule of
fees paid to providers, which is negotiated each year (OECD 2003).
In recent decades most countries have moved toward the application of inde-
pendent criteria of health care needs, frequently referred to as capitation, as the
dominant method of allocation. Capitation can be deﬁned as a kind of price paid
by the pooling organizations for each individual covered by purchasing organiza-
tions with the necessary health services. As individuals’ health expenditures vary
considerably, depending on personal characteristics such as age, sex, and morbid-
ity, increasing effort is being dedicated to risk adjustment, which seeks an unbi-
ased estimate of the expected expenditure of each individual with certain personal
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ent regions of a country, and the pooling responsibility of each region decreases as
the predictive value of the applied capitation rises (Rice and Smith 2002).
However, the predictive value of risk adjusters for setting capitations varies
widely among the countries reviewed here (tables 9.3 and 9.4). Capitations range
from less sophisticated schemes, such as Switzerland’s use of only age and sex as
risk adjusters,to the very complex,but highly predictive capitations in the Nether-
lands and Sweden.Sweden,for instance,applies a very advanced matrix approach,
using age,sex,marital status,employment status,occupation,and housing tenure,
as well as previous high utilization as risk adjusters on an individual level. The
Netherlands might be even one step farther ahead since 2002, when it introduced
a capitation with age, sex, social security and employment status, region of resi-
dence, and even diagnostic and pharmaceutical cost groups as risk adjusters.
Germany shows the typical evolution of capitations. From 1989 to 1995, Ger-
many had a mixed system of pooling expenditure for pensioners while for all other
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TABLE 9.3 Risk adjusters in the capitation formulas for resource allocation in countries with
social health insurance systems

























• Age, sex, social insurance status, employment
status, mortality, urbanization, income
• Age, sex, social insurance status, employment
status, mortality, urbanization, income,
diagnostic and pharmaceutical cost groups
• Age, sex, disability pension status
• Age, sex, disability pension status,
participation in disease management program
• Age, sex
• Age, sex, region, disability status
• Age, sex, social security/employment status,
region of residence
• Age, sex, social security/employment status,
region of residence, diagnostic and
pharmaceutical cost groups
• Age, sex
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tion among funds in 1996 was preceded by the introduction of a risk-adjustment
mechanism considering age, sex, and disability (Busse 2001). Since then, sickness
funds have had to cover all expenditures with the resources allocated from the cen-
tral pool or else have had to increase their contribution rate. Thus sickness funds
have been reduced to their purchasing function, although they still carry a certain
ﬁnancial risk. That risk was further reduced by the extension of the capitation to
participation in disease management programs. Other countries, such as the
Netherlands and Switzerland,have followed similar approaches.
In summary, nearly every high-income country applies some kind of capita-
tion approach to allocate resources from pooling to purchasing organizations.
Even systems such as Korea’s,with only one central sickness fund that acts as both
the pooling and purchasing organization, needs some mechanism to allocate
resources among the regions.Whatever health ﬁnancing arrangement is chosen,a
capitation approach is necessary to redistribute pooled resources equitably. If a
system intends to establish competition among sickness funds,capitation also has
the regulatory function of equalizing the chances of success for each fund. The
higher the predictive value of the capitation, the fairer is the competition and the
more equitable is the allocation.
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TABLE 9.4 Risk adjusters in capitation formulas for resource allocation in countries with 
tax-ﬁnanced systems
Country Risk adjusters
Australia  Age, sex, ethnic group, homelessness, mortality, education level, rurality
Canada Age, sex, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, remoteness
Denmark Age, number of children in single-parent families, number of rented ﬂats, unemployment,
education, immigrants, social status, single elderly people
England Age, mortality, morbidity, unemployment, elderly people living alone, ethnic origin,
socioeconomic status
Finland Age, disability, morbidity, archipelago, remoteness
Iceland None
Ireland Not applicable 
Italy Age, sex, mortality, morbidity, utilization
New Zealand Age, sex, welfare status, ethnicity, rurality
Norway Age, sex, mortality, elderly living alone, marital status
Portugal Based mainly on historical precedent; age, relative burden of illness (diabetes,
hypertension, tuberculosis, AIDS) 
Spain Percent of population older than 65, “insularity” (region = islands)
Sweden Age, sex, marital status, employment status, occupation, housing tenure, high utilizer
Source: Rice and Smith 2002; Mapelli 1999; Järvelin, Rico, and Cetani 2002; Vallgarda, Krasnik, and Vrangbaek 2001.
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Purchasing refers to the transfer of pooled resources to service providers, and
remuneration refers to the mechanism used to allocate the resources. Purchasing
organizations must have the same funds as, but are not necessarily identical to,
pooling organizations. Each method for remunerating providers creates different
behavioral incentives for service providers. Two main objectives have to be clari-
ﬁed before designing payment systems. First, the market structure has to be taken
into account as a framework for activities of purchasing organizations. A single
purchaser can cover a whole nation or multiple purchasers can be assigned to
ﬁxed areas or compete with each other in the same areas. Second, it is important
to be clear about the role assigned to the purchasers: a passive role as a ﬁnancial
intermediary or an active role with full ﬁnancial power to achieve a deﬁned level
of quality and efﬁciency.
Market structure of purchasing organizations
The number of purchasing organizations, their size, and their market structure
vary widely across the countries reviewed here (ﬁgure 9.3). Nonetheless, the
decentralization wave has reached almost every country over the last three
decades, pushing purchasing decisions down from central to regional or local
authorities. Only a few countries still retain centralized single-purchaser systems.
During the 1990s,Germany and the Netherlands,which previously had noncom-
peting multiple-purchaser systems,introduced choice among sickness funds—in this
respect joining Belgium and Switzerland.Before the introduction of competition,the
members of each sickness fund were deﬁned mainly on the basis of occupation or
geographic area. The motivation was not so much a reduction of administrative
costs,as is often assumed,but rather an increase of allocative efﬁciency,a decrease of






























United States (non-Medicare) 
Australia, Canada, Denmark
Spain, Finland, Ireland,
Italy, Norway, New Zealand
Portugal, United Kingdom,
United States (Medicare)
FIGURE 9.3 Market structures for purchasing organizations in high-income countries
Source: Adapted from Kutzin 2001.
HFR_ch09.qxd  3/15/06  3:50 PM  Page 302expenditure per insured or an increase in quality of the purchased services.Competi-
tion has been accompanied by a large reduction in the number of sickness funds,
ranging from cuts of 21 percent in Belgium to 70.6 percent in Germany between
1990 and 2002.
The role of the purchaser
During the 1970s and 1980s,the role of the purchaser was still limited to that of a
ﬁnancial intermediary providing or reimbursing the necessary services on behalf
of the population.Because of increasing cost pressure during the late 1980s,how-
ever, several countries tried to integrate market mechanisms into their systems to
increase the quality and efﬁciency of provided services. During the 1990s, pur-
chasing organizations in both social health insurance and tax-ﬁnanced countries
gained more autonomy in management and planning, through both contracting
and the management of care (not necessarily “managed care” in a narrow sense).
Although care management is a rather recent development, many countries with
multiple purchaser systems experimented with contracting during the 1990s.
In geographically distinct multiple-payer systems, which are mainly tax-
ﬁnanced systems,an active role of regional purchasing organizations is frequently
referred to as an internal market. In 1991 the British national health service
embarked on a large-scale experiment of creating an internal or quasi-market
within the health system,by separating purchasers from providers and by encour-
aging competition among providers. Providers became quasi-independent enti-
ties managing their own budgets and ﬁnancing them through contracts with
purchasers (Le Grand 1999). There were two types of purchasers: district health
authorities and general practitioner (GP) fund-holding schemes. Large GP prac-
tices were given a budget from which to purchase a more limited range of sec-
ondary care on behalf of their patients.This move reﬂected the idea that GPs are a
better agent for the patient than health authorities,because they have better infor-
mation on the quality of secondary providers and better knowledge of patients’
preferences than health authorities.
Although in efﬁciency, equity, choice, and responsiveness, the internal market
may not have delivered as much as its proponents had hoped, it did not do too
badly—especially when its performance is compared with what has happened
since it was ofﬁcially abolished in 1997. GP fund-holding seems to have been par-
ticularly effective,with recent research suggesting that it reduced waiting times and
referral rates (Dixon, Le Grand, and Smith 2003). Several new problems had also
become evident.These included high transaction costs; inequities brought about by
splitting purchasing between health authorities and GP fund-holders (Dixon, Le
Grand,and Smith 2003); and most worrying,a serious deterioration in clinical out-
comes in some instances (Propper, Burgess, and Abraham 2002). Most policy ana-
lysts agree that in some unmeasurable ways the national health service had changed
fundamentally through the internal market reforms. Changes in culture included
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and more clarity about what services should be provided for whom,to what stan-
dard, and at what price (Le Grand 1999). Although in 1997 the newly elected
Labour government formally abolished the Thatcher internal market,it has devel-
oped its own version of an internal market, which maintains the purchaser-
provider split.In 2003 it replaced the district health authorities with primary care
trusts, in which GPs and other health professionals again hold executive func-
tions.Selected hospitals,called foundation hospitals,are being given more auton-
omy, and there is a highly controversial scheme to attract private investment for
national health service hospitals (Pollock, Shaoul, and Vickers 2002). Thus, the
Labour measures have taken the market orientation of the national health service
much further than the conservative predecessor government.
Other tax-ﬁnanced countries have also introduced partial purchaser-provider
splits, but mostly on a smaller scale. For example, Sweden introduced internal
markets in its national health service in Stockholm County in 1992. Like reforms
in the United Kingdom, Sweden’s reforms created modest increases in productiv-
ity,efﬁciency,and responsiveness (Quaye 1997).In New Zealand internal markets
were introduced in 1993 to achieve greater allocative and technical efﬁciency and
to contain overall health expenditure. Therefore, formerly separate funding
streams for general practitioner services and for hospitals and other services were
merged, and four regional health authorities (RHA) were established (French,
Old,and Healy 2001).In 1996,citing a steep rise in transaction costs after the 1993
reforms,problems with equity of access to care,and substantial deﬁcits in three of
the four RHA and many public hospital providers that had to be met by the gov-
ernment (Gauld 1999), a new government decided that the reforms had failed to
meet their objectives and decided to merge the four RHA into a single purchasing
organization.
Like the move to internal markets in tax-ﬁnanced countries,selective contract-
ing has developed in some social health insurance countries. In Belgium, France,
and Luxembourg,speciﬁc beneﬁts are deﬁned by the government,leaving volume
and prices to the purchasing organizations.However,the volume of these beneﬁts
is quite small. Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland even moved one step
further. Governments understood that competition among sickness funds cannot
work if the single funds have no management instruments to differentiate them in
competition. Therefore, sickness funds in all three countries have received more
autonomy,not only in selective contracting but also in marketing activities,bonus
payments for patients and providers, and other incentive measures.
In the Netherlands, selective contracting has been encouraged since 1992.
Under the Anti-Cartel Act, collective contracting in health care has been illegal
from 2002 (den Exter and others 2004). Hospitals were exempted from this regu-
lation, but the Anti-Cartel Authority announced that it would sue sickness funds
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still contract providers on a collective basis, mainly because of the high transac-
tion costs in contract negotiations with each single provider. In the Netherlands,
as well as in Germany and Switzerland, sickness funds are also allowed to selec-
tively contract with provider networks and to freely negotiate prices for services.
The number of selective contracts is low but growing. Since 2004, German sick-
ness funds are required to spend 1 percent of their total expenditure for such con-
tracts with provider networks under the so-called integrated care scheme. This
scheme is expected to achieve greater integration of different service sectors that
are traditionally separated and thus to prevent duplication of utilization and
achieve better outcomes. Selective contracting also breaks up cartels in ambula-
tory care, wherein physician associations negotiate on behalf of all social health
insurance physicians in each region.
In all three countries sickness funds have also received more autonomy to excel
in care management activities. In Switzerland, the two biggest funds are offering
disease management programs,but the share of participants is rather low,at 5 per-
cent of estimated potential participants (Weber and others 2004).To boost partici-
pation rates,the German government followed an innovative approach to increase
the attractiveness of programs. Sickness funds are allowed to offer disease man-
agement programs, and participants enrolled in approved programs have been
treated as a separate category in the risk structure compensation scheme since
2002.Thus,sickness funds with a high share of disease management program par-
ticipants receive a higher budget from the pooling organization (Federal Insur-
ance Authority).This was expected to stimulate the sickness funds to try to attract
and care more about the chronically ill insured (instead of looking at them as “bad
risks”). Critics pointed out that the act mainly provides an incentive for the sick-
ness funds to enroll as many chronically ill insured as possible,but not necessarily
to improve their care, as the individual sickness funds get compensated for the
average expenditure of all disease management program participants across sick-
ness funds (by age and sex) (Busse 2004).
Remuneration of providers
The shift toward purchaser-provider splits in tax-ﬁnanced health systems and more
active purchasing by sickness funds in social health insurance systems has been
accompanied by changes in physician and hospital remuneration mechanisms in
many countries. The new transparency of service provision that was created by the
active contracting process and a heightened cost-consciousness by decision makers,
purchasers, and providers alike might have been the main triggers for changes in
remuneration mechanisms,rather than purely the desire to control costs.
Historically, provider remuneration has been mainly time- and population-
based in tax-ﬁnanced countries, whereas in social health insurance and mixed
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based remuneration methods were and are still commonplace.During the 1980s,
global budgets alongside fee-for-service payments for private hospitals or private
patients in public hospitals,were still the main mechanism to ﬁnance public hos-
pital care in most tax-ﬁnanced high-income countries. Hospitals received a
prospective annual ﬁxed budget with which to cover all their services. Most of
the time this budget reﬂected historical spending rather than service intensity or
morbidity of patients cared for. Fee-for-service remains the principal means of
paying hospital services in Japan; in some cantons in Switzerland, hospitals are
paid according to individual services provided (Docteur and Oxley 2003).
In 1983 the U.S. Medicare program became the ﬁrst major public payer to
introduce a payment per patient episode—the diagnosis-related group (DRG)
system. With this type of remuneration mechanism, ﬁnancing is based on a
prospectively speciﬁed payment per discharge unit standardized for variation in
types of cases or case mix. Different pathologies are grouped into homogeneous
cost groups on the basis of either medical conditions or surgical interventions,
and average costs of treatment for each group are estimated. When discharged
from the hospital, the patient is assigned to a speciﬁc group and the hospital
receives a lump sum corresponding to the average cost of a patient in this group.
Since then, the majority of tax-ﬁnanced or social health insurance countries
have introduced some form of per case payment systems in their hospital ﬁnanc-
ing systems—most partially and in some combination with global budgets. Tax-
ﬁnanced countries that have developed their own DRG payments or adapted
existing systems from other countries and implemented them include Sweden
(1985), Finland (1987), Portugal (1989), Canada (1990), Australia (1993), the
United Kingdom (1992), Ireland (1993), Italy (1995), Denmark (1999), and Nor-
way (1999).The ﬁrst social health insurance country to introduce DRG payments
was Belgium in 1995, followed by Germany (a partial system in 1995, revised in
2003), France (1997), Austria (1997), Switzerland (1997), the Catalonia region in
Spain (1998),and the Netherlands (2003).In Japan (2003) a system called diagno-
sis procedure combination was introduced.Hospitals receive a deﬁned number of
points,each with a ﬁxed value,for each service.Korea has developed its own DRG
system, but has not implemented it (Fischer 2003).
Over the years,problems have emerged with per case payment methods,includ-
ing their administrative and operational complexity,their dependence on the avail-
ability of relatively consistent and comprehensive activity and cost data, and the
need for incentives to ensure that costs are limited by service type within remuner-
ation boundaries (Langenbrunner and Wiley 2002). On the positive side, prospec-
tive pricing systems appear to have encouraged greater cost efﬁciency in the
hospital sector. Evidence from the United States indicates that there have been sig-
niﬁcant falls in average length of hospital stays compared with other remuneration
methods,although this may also have been accompanied by lower intensity of care
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counties that used prospective remuneration systems with those that did not sug-
gested cost differentials of 10 percent in favor of prospective remuneration
(Gerdtham and others 1999; Gerdtham,Rehnberg,and Tambour 1999).
However,the use of these remuneration methods may conﬂict with overall expen-
diture control, particularly in the presence of excess supply or productivity reserves.
For example, the introduction of DRGs in Stockholm County led to a sharp rise in
activity and spending, and as a result, central expenditure control was reimposed
through penalties for exceeding volume limits (Docteur and Oxley 2003).
For ambulatory care,the traditional mechanisms of fee-for-service payments in
social health insurance systems and salaries in tax-funded systems have been
largely replaced by combination systems, which try to outweigh the positive and
negative incentives of each individual payment mechanism to encourage providers
to align their behavior with the purchaser’s objectives.Examples are the mixed cap-
itation payment to physician associations and point-based fee-for-service payment
to individual German physicians or the capitation payment to British GPs,which is
supplemented by fee-for-service payments for underprovided services, for exam-
ple, childhood immunizations or cancer screening activities. The same develop-
ment can be seen in the remuneration of hospital doctors, who now more often
receive performance-related payments on top of their salaries.
Endnotes
1. As explained below, medical savings accounts can have the character of compulsory
contributions and are therefore subsumed under social security.
2. One must also keep in mind “tax expenditures” resulting from the deductibility of
health insurance premiums from corporate and individual taxes as another form of pub-
lic expenditure. Such deductibles in the United States amount to some 10 percent of total
health spending, and if included as a public expenditure signiﬁcantly increase the U.S.
public share.
3. Since the introduction of compulsory health insurance in 1996, Switzerland has had a
system of both income- and risk-unrelated per capita health insurance premiums.These pre-
miums differ among insurers but are community-rated for all insured of a particular insurer
in a certain region (usually at the subcanton level) (Minder,Schoenholzer,and Amiet 2000).
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